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This paper focuses on the effect of import protection on the response of the real exchange
rate to capital flows. The central hypothesis is that barriers to imports blunt the expenditure
and production shifting effects of changes in relative prices, and hence the ability of the
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I. Introduction
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industry and the impact of international capital flows on the real exchange rate.
The central proposition, one sketched out in an earlier paper by Sjaastad (1991),
is that protection renders expenditure and production shifting between traded
and home (i.e., nontraded) goods less responsive to relative prices, and hence
increases the variance of the real exchange rate relative to that of capital flows;
this occurs because protection reduces the volume of trade and, perhaps, the
margins of substitution between traded and home goods as well. The result is
that the real exchange rate reacts more strongly to capital flows in highly
protected economies than in those with liberal commercial policies.
While it is obvious that import protection generates an import-competing
sector unable to cope with foreign competition, it also has been found that an
important manifestation of high protection is a retardation of industrialized
exports (Miranda, 1986) and, consequently, an inordinate dependence on
natural-resource-based export activities such as agriculture and mining. These
industries are often slow in their ability to expand and contract, at least in the
short run. In addition, as tariff structures are rarely uniform, imports become
concentrated in low-tariff items which, in highly protected economies, tend to
be capital goods, raw materials, and intermediate goods essential to the
functioning of the protected industrial sector. This pattern of trade exacerbates
the difficulty of adjusting to international capital flows; moreover, if the real
exchange rate is rendered inflexible upwards by rigidity of both wages and the
exchange rate, the necessary adjustments come about in quantities rather than
prices, leading to the classic “stop-go” economy.
This paper sets out to test these ideas. In particular, we attempt to identify
the effect of protection on the response of the real exchange rate to international
capital flows, the central hypothesis being that, other things equal, protection
leads to greater variability of the real exchange rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a
selective review of the existing literature, and Section III develops a simple
model that highlights the impact of protection on the behavior of the real
exchange rate. The empirical methodology and results are presented in
Section IV, in which estimates of the elasticity of the real exchange rate with
respect to capital flows are found to be strongly affected by notional levels of
protection. Policy implications are briefly discussed in the final section.179 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
II. A Selective Survey of Existing Literature
The role of the real exchange rate in macroeconomic adjustment has become
prominent in recent research on open economies such as that of Edwards
(1988). It is typically argued that stable real exchange rates at appropriate levels
send the correct signals to economic agents and facilitate smooth adjustment
of the balance of payments, thereby ensuring macroeconomic stability and
increased welfare; as Mussa (1982) has pointed out, however, the variance of
purchasing power parity (PPP) real exchange rates, defined as ep*/p, where e
is the nominal exchange rate and p and p* are the domestic and foreign price
levels, respectively, has increased sharply since fixed parities among the major
currencies were abandoned in 1973. It also is frequently argued that persistent
deviations from PPP are often due to misguided government policies that
influence the allocation of spending between traded and home goods and
services.
A. The Salter Effect
Since Salter’s seminal 1959 paper, it is widely accepted that real exchange
rates respond to international capital flows, which have accelerated in recent
years, particularly so in the developing countries over the past decade. The
response of the real exchange rate to capital flows, however, appears to differ
across regions. Sachs (1981) analyzed the linkage between real exchange rates
and the current accounts in OECD countries and found that over the 1970s many
of the deficit countries experienced real exchange rate appreciation, while
surplus countries (which included Japan and the United States) showed real
depreciation. Schadler (1994) finds that capital flows into Thailand, Spain,
Mexico, Egypt, Colombia and Chile during the late 1980s and early 1990s lead
to real appreciations, while the IMF (1991), Calvo et al. (1993), and Khan and
Reinhart (1995) find that, on average, the Latin American countries experienced
larger real appreciations than did the Asian countries.
One prominent explanation for these differences is that the two regions
do not attract the same kind of capital; direct foreign investment was more
important in Asia than in Latin America. Companies investing in a new plant
are likely to import the necessary equipment to run it; as the capital inflows180 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
are used to pay for those imports, the real exchange rate is unaffected. Others
argue that the Asian economies channel foreign capital into investment,
whereas Latin Americans tend to spend it on consumption. A third argument
is that Latin American central banks have been less successful in sterilizing
capital inflows by open market operations; the efficacy of sterilization is,
however, open to question as at best it is effective only in the short run. It is
the purpose of this paper to provide a fourth explanation for these differences;
namely, that the greater is the degree of openness of an economy, the weaker
will be the response of the real exchange rate to capital flows.
B. Liberalization and the Real Exchange Rate: The Sequencing Issue
The behavior of the real exchange rate is highly relevant to the design of
liberalization policies and their effect on the balance of payments; Khan and
Zahler (1983) provide a systematic analysis of the short run effects of
liberalization on both the current and capital accounts. Central to that issue is
the proper sequencing of the liberalization of trade and capital movements; in
this context, the “Southern Cone” syndrome is relevant. That syndrome refers
to the Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan liberalization cum stabilization
policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While in full pursuit of ambitious
liberalization programs, all three countries adopted exchange-rate-based
stabilization plans involving minute, pre-announced, and diminishing rates
of devaluation of their currencies against the U.S. dollar – the infamous tablitas.
This policy mix succeeded only partially in reducing inflation (partly because
the dollar itself was rapidly depreciating until mid-1980), but did result in
large capital inflows in response to sustained interest rate differentials.
By the early 1980s all three Southern Cone countries had experienced
substantial real appreciations, and all were confronting severe balance of
payments crises as well as deep recession. Fernandez (1985) argued that capital
inflows played a fundamental role in the short run dynamics of the Argentine
real exchange rate, an argument that has been echoed by Corbo (1985) in the
Chilean context and by Hanson and De Mello (1985) for the Uruguayan case.
It is noteworthy, however, that despite the similarity of their exchange rate
policies, real appreciations were far larger in Argentina and Uruguay than in
Chile, which may be in part due to commercial policy; as Bruno (1985) pointed181 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
out, an important contrast between Chile, on the one hand, and Argentina and
Uruguay on the other, was the high and growing degree of openness of the
Chilean economy.1
The Southern Cone experiences have been widely analyzed by Bruno
(1985), Harberger (1982), McKinnon (1982), and Sjaastad (1983), among
others and, while that literature offers significant lessons for economic policy,
little systematic analysis has established a precise link between the degree of
openness of the economy and the quantitative response of the real exchange
rate to international capital movements – the central theme of this paper.
Although many might agree with McKinnon (1982) on the danger of removing
capital controls in the face of heavy protection, as well as with Bruno’s (1985)
argument that “one important lesson (from the Southern Cone) for the
sequencing of markets would seem to be placing the current account far ahead
of the capital account in terms of timing” (p. 868), a definitive analytical
underpinning for these views is not evident. Some believe that, because asset
prices can adjust instantaneously while prices of goods and services adjust
gradually, the real exchange rate impacts more quickly and strongly on the
capital account than the current account. Others, such as Frenkel (1983) in his
two-horse carriage analogy, argue that the capital account adjusts more rapidly
than does the current account. Unfortunately, this proposition is not a scientific
one as it cannot be refuted empirically; since current account deficits, as
measured, are identical with capital account surpluses (apart from errors and
omissions), it is impossible to observe any difference in speeds of adjustment
of the two accounts.
The contribution of this study to the sequencing issue lies in the evidence
that protection magnifies the reaction of real exchange rates to capital flows
with the implication that unless prices, wages, and/or the exchange rate are
highly flexible, free movement of capital in the face of heavy protection may
be a recipe for macroeconomic instability. This argument should not be
interpreted as support of capital controls, but rather as a rationale for the view
1 According to Fernandez (1985), from 1978 to 1981 the Argentine real exchange rate fell
by 34 per cent, and De Mello et al. (1985) calculate the decline in Uruguay at nearly 46 per
cent, whereas Galvez and Tybout (1985) estimate the Chilean real appreciation to have
been only 20 per cent in the same period.182 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
that the dismantling of those controls be held in abeyance until trade
liberalization is largely complete.
III. Capital Flows and the Real Exchange Rate
This section presents a skeletal model that illuminates the link between
real exchange rates and capital flows, and also examines the ways in which
import protection can exacerbate the variability of the real exchange rate. In
view of the evidence that PPP real exchange rates are subject to substantial
measurement error (Sjaastad 1998a, 1998b), the real exchange rate in this
study is defined as a price index for internationally-traded goods relative to
an index for nontraded (or home) goods rather than the PPP version thereof.
A. A Model of the Home-Goods Sector
The relationship between capital flows and the real exchange rate is based
on equilibrium in the market for home goods. The economy has three types of
goods and services: importables, exportables, and home goods, whose price
indices are pM, pX, and pH, respectively. Under an exchange rate rule, pH is
endogenous, and with a money supply rule, pM and pX are endogenous; in both
cases, the endogenous price(s) induces the requisite expenditure and production
shifting to accommodate a capital flow. The supply of home goods, 
S H q
depends
upon the three prices and gross domestic product (GDP), designated by g. The
demand for home goods, 
, D H q
 is a function of the same three prices, GDP
corrected for the terms of trade, designated by y, and capital flows, indicated by
k; k > 0 implies a capital inflow. The actual capital-flow variable is kg = k/g.
Letting upper-case letters be the natural logarithms of lower-case letters,
a local log-linear version of the model can be written as follows:
where εH, i =
S Hi QP ∂∂
and ηH, i =
D Hi QP ∂∂
for i = H, M, X; since the effect of the
++++ S HH,HHH,MMH,XXH,G QconstantPPPG εεεε
1++++++ D HH,HHH,MMH,XXH,YH,kg QconstantPPPYln(k) ηηηηη
DS HHH QQQ
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terms of trade on income is captured by Y, the ηH, i elasticities involve only




are homogeneous of degree zero in
the three prices, εH, H + εH, M + εH, X = 0, and ηH, H + ηH, M + ηH, X = 0. The parameter
ηH, Y = 
D H QY ∂∂ (/)/()/ DD HHHH PqyPqy  ∂∂ 
 mpsH, y / apsH  is the  ratio  of
marginal  and  average  propensities  to  spend on home  goods. As   the
parameter  ηH, k  is   the   elasticity  of        with  respect to  1 +  kg,  the  ratio  of
expenditure to GDP, we have ηH,k=
ln(1) D Hg Qk ∂∂+ ()/ln(1)/ D Hg Qkkk  ∂∂∂+∂ 
  mpsH,k  /
H aps
in which mpsH,k  = 
/ D HH pqk ∂∂
  and H aps ()/(); D HH pqgk +
 note that ηH, k and ηH, Y are not necessarily identical.
A local solution for PH  is the following:
PH = constant + [ω PM + (1 - ω) PX] - θ* ln(1 + kg) - γ* ln(1 + TT)         (2)
in which ω = (εH, M - ηH, M)/(ηH, H - εH, H) is the “shift” parameter in the theory of
the incidence of protection (see Sjaastad, 1980), θ* = ηH, k /(ηH, H - εH, H) < 0,
and γ* = εH, g /(ηH, H - εH, H). Since changes in y and g have similar effects on D H Q
and 
, S H Q
those variables (and their parameters) were combined into a terms-
of-trade variable TT, whose definition can be found in the Data Appendix.
From  equation  (2), ω = ￿PH /￿PM = (￿PH /￿PT) (￿PT /￿PM),  where  PT  is
a  traded-goods  price  index.  But  the  homogeneity  postulate  requires  that
￿PH /￿PT = 1,  so  it  follows  that  PT   can  satisfy  that postulate if and only if
￿PT /￿PM = ω, a requirement that is met by defining PT  as ωPM + (1 - ω)PX.
As the real exchange rate is defined (in natural logs) as RER = PT – PH ,
equation (2) is an implicit relationship between capital flows and the real
exchange rate.2 The explicit relationship can be written as:
RER = constant + θ* ln(1 + kg) - γ* ln(1 + TT)        (3)
where θ* and γ* are the elasticities of the real exchange rate with respect to
the expenditure-output ratio and the income effects associated with changes
D H q
2 With PT = ωPM + (1 - ω)PX, it follows that ￿RER / ￿PM = ω − ￿PH / ￿PM = 0 and ￿RER / ￿PX
=  (1 - ω) - ￿PH / ￿PX = 0, so the real exchange rate as defined in the text is invariant with
respect to changes in PM and PX brought about by protectionist measures that do not involve
first-order income effects. That property is not shared by PPP real exchange rates.184 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
in the terms of trade, respectively. The effect of import protection on the
magnitude of the parameter θ* obviously is the focal point of the analysis.
B. Some Consequences of Protection
Import protection affects the magnitude of θ* via a scale effect and perhaps
also through a substitution effect. The scale effect arises because a protection-
induced decline in the volume of trade magnifies the proportionate response
of imports and exports to capital flows. When imports and exports are twenty-
five to thirty per cent of GDP, a capital inflow of five percent of GDP can be
accommodated with a relatively small increase in imports and/or a small
reduction in exports. But when import protection has reduced the volume of
imports and exports to, say, seven per cent of GDP, the required adjustments
are relatively much larger. The scale effect is analogous to one of the sources
of the recent external debt service problem in Argentina. While many
commentators have pointed out that the Argentine external debt was not unduly
large relative to her GDP, the fact that intense import protection in that country
has severely contracted the volume of Argentine international trade with the
result that, during 2001, interest payments on her external debt were equal to
approximately fifty per cent of her export revenue.
Concerning the substitution effect, it is evident from casual observation
that countries pursuing liberal trade policies have substantial domestic
production of a rather broad set of importables and quite highly diversified
exports, the outputs of which can readily expand or contract in response to
changes in the real exchange rate. But the picture is very different in countries
engaged in intense import substitution. In the first place, those countries
typically adopt bi-modal tariff structures; protection granted to targeted
industries usually is prohibitive (so the goods produced by those industries
are no longer imported) while nontargeted imports face rather low tariffs.3
As the number of targeted goods increases, the composition of imports
undergoes a radical change; imports become concentrated in capital goods,
raw materials, and intermediate goods, products that lack domestic substitutes
3 For example, in 1975 the average tariff in Uruguay (a highly protectionist country) was
117 per cent, but tariff revenue was only ten per cent of the value of imports.185 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
and which are used in roughly fixed proportions with value added in the
protected industrial sector. In the limit, prohibitive tariffs are so pervasive
that no domestically-produced goods are imported and no imported goods
are produced domestically; in that case, any substitution between imports
and home goods becomes limited to the final demand for the output of the
protected industrial sector, thereby greatly weakening the expenditure and
production-shifting effects induced by changes in the real exchange rate.
A similar phenomenon occurs in the export sector. Import protection is
shifted onto the export sector in the form of an implicit export tax, the shifting
being effected via increased costs (particularly wages) relative to output prices
in the export sector (Sjaastad, 1980, Clements and Sjaastad, 1984). As
protection grows, the implicit tax also increases and those export-oriented
activities employing internally-mobile resources are the most vulnerable and
the first to succumb (Miranda, 1986). When protection becomes intense, the
only exports to survive are those in which sector-specific inputs (typically
natural resources) account for a large part of total cost; those inputs have no
alternative but to absorb the implicit tax. Sector-specific inputs are typically
found in agriculture and mining, where supply elasticities are known to be
low, at least in the short run. In many small countries (e.g., Chile and
Australia), domestic demand for mineral products is minuscule relative to
production, so the degree of substitution in consumption between those
products and home goods is very small; in the case of agriculture, that
substitution effect is limited as the demand for food products is price inelastic.
Thus trade barriers also diminish substitution possibilities between home
goods and exportables.
The nature of the scale and substitution effects can be illustrated further in
the context of our model; one way involves transforming the denominator of
the coefficient θ*, ηH, H - εH, H, into cross elasticities. Differentiating the identity DS HHMHHX qpmpqpxpk ++ +
with respect to pH, where m and x are  the
quantities  of  imports  and  exports,  respectively, and holding k, pM, and pX
constant    results   in:
             Setting 
, DS HHH qqq
this expression can be written in elasticity
form as:
ηH, H - εH, H = εX, H αX - ηM, H αM                                                                                               (4)
////. DSS HHHHMHHHHHXH qpqppmpqpqppxp +∂∂+∂∂ +∂∂+∂∂186 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
in which εX, H = ￿X / ￿PH < 0 and ηM, H = ￿M / ￿PH > 0 are the cross elasticities
of export supply and import demand with respect to pH, αX = (xpX) / (qH pH),
and αM = (mpM) / (qH pH) are the ratios of exports and imports to expenditure
on nontraded goods. Combining equation (4) with the definition of θ* results
in an alternative expression for that parameter:
θ* = ηH, K / (εX, H αX - ηM, H αM)                                                             (5)
The scale effect associated with import protection is quite evident as that
protection diminishes both αX and αM, thereby increasing the magnitude of
θ*.4 The substitution effect associated with import protection would be reflected
in a smaller magnitude of the cross elasticities ηM, H and εX, H. The strength of
the substitution effect, however, is ambiguous. In the case of imports, for
example, ηM, H = (￿m / ￿PH) / m, and import protection has a negative effect on
both ￿m / ￿PH and m. Accordingly, the nature of the effect on εX, H and ηM, H can
be established only on the basis of empirical evidence. It is important to note
that even if import protection were to have no effect on either εX, H or ηM, H, it
still can have a profound effect on ηH, H and εH, H .
A second way to illustrate the scale and substitution effects is to derive
the direct and indirect effects of a capital flow on the volume of imports.
Holding pM, pX, GDP, and the terms of trade constant we have:
where mpsM, k is the marginal propensity to spend on importables with respect
to a capital inflow and apsM = (mpM) / (g + k) is the import ratio. As was
pointed out above, while import protection has an ambiguous effect on the
4 Exports decline because import protection involves an implicit tax on exports; for evidence
on that issue, see Sjaastad (1980), Clements and Sjaastad (1984).
()/ M dmpdk [ ] /(/)(/) MHH pmkmPPk ∂∂+∂∂∂∂
, Mk mps + ,()/ln(1)ln(1)/ MMHHgg mpPkkk η  ∂∂+∂+∂ 
, Mk mps + ,()/() MMH mpgk η θ+
, Mk mps , MMH aps η θ
(6)187 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
elasticity ηM, H, it clearly reduces the import ratio, apsM, and probably mpsM, k
as well, which reduces the right hand side of equation (6). While import
protection may affect the magnitude of d(mpM) / dk, the direction of that effect
is unclear. Accordingly, there is a strong presumption that import protection
must increase the magnitude of θ* to offset the decline it induces in the
magnitudes of both apsM  and mpsM, k.
IV. Empirical Methodology and Results
To test the central hypothesis of this paper one might specify θ* as a function
of a protection-level variable and estimate that relationship with time series
data; that approach, however, is unpromising as efforts to quantity protection
have met with meager success. The average (or median) tariff can be
meaningless, as tariffs in highly protectionist countries tend to be either
prohibitively high or quite low.5 The ratio of tariff revenue to imports cannot
distinguish between low and high levels of protection; moreover, neither
measure can detect non-tariff barriers. In view of these difficulties, it was
decided to determine if the magnitude of θ* differs systematically across three
small, broadly similar countries, Argentina, Australia, and Canada, all of which
have abundant natural resource endowments but very different commercial
policies. Canadian markets have been very open to international trade in recent
decades while Australia reputedly has been one of the most protectionist of
the OECD club. Argentina’s aggressive protection of  her industrial sector is
legendary; indeed, the uniform tariff equivalent of the Argentine tariff structure
in the in the decade of the 1970s has been estimated at  98  per cent.6
The summary data for the three countries in Table 1 indicate that the degree
of “openness” (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) during 1978-92 is
5 Due to bi-modal tariff schedules, tariff revenue is often a very small fraction of the average
(or median) tariff rate. As was noted earlier, in 1975 when Uruguay was a highly protectionist
country, her average tariff was 117 per cent, but tariff revenue was only about ten per cent
of imports.
6 The uniform tariff equivalent is the uniform tariff that would result in the same volume of
trade as does the actual tariff structure. The estimate of the uniform tariff equivalent for
Argentina is from Sjaastad (1981).188 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Three Small Economies: Period Averages,
1978-92
Country Population Real GDP (billions, Openess (%)
(millions) 1985 U.S. dollars)
Argentina 30.3 168.1 14.90
Australia 15.6 216.2 34.07
Canada 25.0 394.2 52.25
Source:  Penn World Tables and World Bank STARS database.
highest for Canada and lowest for Argentina. Canada out traded Argentina by
three and half times and Australia did so by more than two times. As Canada’s
GDP was more than twice that of Argentina, this ranking conflicts with the idea
that trade is more important for a small economy than a larger one. While factors
other than protection affect a country’s trading activity, there can no doubt that
at least part of the large but perverse differences in the trade volumes of these
three countries arises from vastly differing degrees of import protection.
A. An Indirect Test
The first test of the proposition that import protection increases the
magnitude of θ* was an indirect one based on the response of imports to
capital flows described in the previous section. To test that proposition, a
discrete version of equation (6) was specified as follows:
∆(mpM  / g)t = constant + β∆kg, t + ut                      (7)
in which β corresponds to d(mpM) / dk.
As θ* is posited to be a function of the degree of import protection, the
quarterly data samples for the three countries had to be chosen to reflect periods
during which their commercial policies were quite stable. In the Argentine case,
the sample begins with 1978:1 and ends with 1992:4, after which there was an
attempt at trade liberalization in that country. In the case of Canada, the sample189 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
starts with 1971:1 and ends with 1994:3, prior to the implementation of NAFTA.
For Australia, the sample period is 1977:3 to 1994:3. When estimates were
made simultaneously for the three countries, the common sample period is that
of Argentina. For details, see the Data Appendix.
Equation (7) was estimated simultaneously using quarterly data for the three
countries by the RATS nonlinear system routine using White’s (1980) robust
standard error estimator (NSYS-ROB). As θ* is posited to be a function both
the relative volume of trade and its composition, the period was limited to
1978:1 to 1992:4 to avoid significant changes in commercial policy in any of
the countries involved. The overall level of protection in those countries was
quite stable from the middle to late 1970s to the early 1990s, but commercial
policy in both Argentina and Australia became somewhat more liberal in the
course of the 1990s. Descriptions and sources of the data appear in the Data
Appendix.
The estimates of β in equation (7), summarized in panel A, Table 2, range
from 0.44 to 0.51 and all three are highly significant.7 While the largest estimate
is for Canada, the estimates are not significantly different from one another as
none of the equality restrictions, reported in panel B, Table 2, are rejected.
When those restrictions are imposed, the estimate of β, reported in panel C,
Table 2, is 0.46 with a t statistic of 11.82. These results could obtain only if the
magnitude of the Argentine θ* far exceeds that of both Australia and Canada.
These results can be used to illustrate the magnitude of the scale effect. From
the definition of  β, we can write θ* = (mpsM, k − β) / (apsM ηM, H). Assuming that
mpsM, k = apsM, β = 0.5, and ηM, H = 1, then θ* =1 - 1/(2 apsM). If apsM = 1/3, then
θ* = -0.5; however, if the import ratio has been reduced to 1/12 by import
protection (as in the case of Argentina), the magnitude of θ* increases
dramatically to -5.0.
B. Individual Country Estimates of Real Exchange Rate Elasticities
The second test of the effect of import protection on real exchange rate
behavior involved estimation of equation (3). For this test, a proxy for the
7 In making the estimates of β, serial correlation in the residuals was reduced by allowing
one lag on the dependent variable. The estimates reported in Table 2 are of the long run
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Table 2. Simultaneous NSYS-ROB Estimates of Equation (7): Argentina,
Australia and Canada, 1978:1-92:4
A. Unrestricted Estimates of  ß
Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value
βARG 0.4396 6.5959 0.0000
βAUS 0.4495 5.2078 0.0000
βCAN 0.5134 5.0455 0.0000
B. Chi-Square Equality Tests on Unrestricted Estimates of  ß
Restrictions χ2 Statistic P-value
βARG = βAUS 0.0062 0.9370
βARG = βCAN 0.3726 0.5416
βAUS = βCAN 0.1787 0.6725
All three 0.3776 0.8279
C. Restricted  Estimate of  ß
Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value
β 0.4567 11.8155 0.0000
D. Summary Statistics (Restricted Estimates)*
Country R2 SEE D-W Ljung-Box test
Q(6) P-value
Argentina 0.7268 0.0077 2.1703 1.6952 0.9455
Australia 0.6811 0.0067 1.9439 6.6733 0.3521
Canada 0.6198 0.0069 1.8541 5.5223 0.4788
Note: * The coefficients of determination were adjusted for degrees of freedom.191 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
real exchange rate was developed, one that one that avoids the difficulties in
constructing a home-goods price index, PH. In short, that price index was
replaced with the overall price level, P = apsH PH + (1 − apsH)Pi. The resulting
proxy for the real exchange rate, RERP = PT   − P = apsH RER, differs from
the real thing only by the factor of proportionality apsH. With this alteration,
equation (3) becomes:
RERPt = constant + θ ln (1 + kg, t) + γ ln(1 + TTt) + υt          (8)
in which θ = aspH θ* and γ = aspH γ *.
B.1. Sims Causality Tests
While the maintained hypothesis is that international capital flows “cause”
the real exchange rate, it can be argued that a change in the real exchange
can by itself induce an international capital flow. A spontaneous shift in
demand away from traded towards nontraded goods, for example would
increase the relative price of nontraded goods and might generate a current
account surplus and hence a capital outflow, at least in the short run.
Therefore, prior to estimating equation (8), the Sims procedure was used to
test for causality.
The real exchange rate proxy, RERP, and the capital flow variable, 1 + kg,
were pre-filtered to eliminate serial correlation. Six leads and lags on the
independent variables were permitted in all cases, and the causality test was
based on the joint significance of the leads.
The results of the Sims tests appear in Table 3. From panel A it is evident
that the hypothesis that capital flows “cause” real exchange rates is not
rejected for any country. Panel B, however, indicates that the reverse causality
is rejected in every country.
B.2. Preliminary Estimates of Equation (8)
Since the real exchange rate may respond to capital flows and the terms
of trade with lags, equation (8) was parameterized as follows:192 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 3. Sims Causality Tests: Argentina, Australia, and Canada












A(L)RERPt = constant + Θ(L)ln(1 + kg, t) + Γ(L)ln(1 + TTt) + νt                               (9)
where A(L) =           is a polynomial of degree M  in positive powers of the
lag operator L, and likewise for Θ(L), whose degree is N, and Γ(L). The
final effect on RERP of a permanent shock to kg is defined as θ = Θ(1)/A(1).
(10)
Preliminary OLS estimates of equation (9), with lags added until the sums
of the polynomial coefficients stabilized, indicated that the joint restriction
A(1) = Θ(1) = 0 could not be rejected for any of the three countries; as a
result, Θ(1)/A(1), the estimator of θ, is indeterminate. To deal with that
problem, A(L) was replaced with the identity A(L) = (1 – L)Ã(L) + LMA(1),
and similarly for Θ(L); the degrees of the new polynomials Ã(L) and Θ(L) are
M-1 and N-1, and  the kth coefficient of Ã(L), for example, is 
0 . k ki iaa ∑
With
A(1) and Θ(1) restricted to zero, equation (9) becomes:
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and the estimator of θ  now is
In the preliminary tests, the restriction A(L) = (1 – L) also could not be
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degree N - 2, the final version of equation (8) is the following:
Estimates of θ based on equation (11), with lagged variables as instruments,
were made for each country by OLS using Hansen’s (1982) generalized method
of moments (OLS-GMM).8As will be seen, the differences in the estimates
of the θ’s are very substantial and consistent with the results reported in Table 2.
Argentina
The joint restrictions A(1) = Θ(1) = 1 are not rejected (see panel A, Table 4);
with those restrictions imposed, the OLS-GMM estimate of θ  is  -6.19 (see
panel B, Table 4). That estimate is significant at the 0.00 per cent level, and is
striking in economic terms: during the sample period a capital inflow of five
per cent of Argentine GDP would inflate her CPI relative to traded-goods
prices by more than thirty per cent!
Australia
The estimates for Australia were made in the same way as for Argentina,
and are summarized in Table 4. With the zero-sum restrictions imposed on
A(1) and Θ(1), the standard error of estimate is only 2.2 per cent, and the
OLS-GMM direct estimate of θ, -2.10, is significant at the 0.00 per cent level
and is about one-third the magnitude of the corresponding estimate for
Argentina.
(1)/(1). A Θ
2 ,,1 ()ln(1)ln(1)()ln(1) tgtgtNtt RERPconLkkLTTv θ + ∆ +Θ∆++∆++Γ++
(11)
8 In none of the three cases were the estimates of θ sensitive to variations of plus and minus
0.2 in the value of ω used to construct PT.194 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 4. OLS-GMM Estimates of Real Exchange Rate Elasticities
(Equation 11)
A. Chi-Square Tests on Joint  Restrictions
Country Restrictions χ2
 (2) Statistic P-value
Argentina A(1) = Θ(1) = 0      1.3909   0.4988
Australia A(1) = Θ(1) = 0      0.5887   0.7450
Canada A(1) = Θ(1) = 0      0.7548   0.6857
B. Restricted Elasticity Estimates
Country Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value
Argentina Θ -6.1914 -20.7895 0.0000
Australia Θ -2.0996 -7.7314 0.0000
Canada Θ -0.6605 -2.7427 0.0061
C. Summary  Statistics*
Country R2 SEE D-W                 Ljung-Box test
Q(8) P-value
Argentina 0.8737 0.1205 1.8688 5.6328 0.6883
Australia 0.9670 0.0219 1.5905 5.4219 0.7117
Canada 0.9679 0.0280 2.0873 6.3998 0.6025
Note: * The coefficients of determination were calculated on the basis of the variance of
RERP and adjusted for degrees of freedom.
Canada
In the Canadian case the estimate of θ was made in the same way as for
Argentina and Australia and the results appear in Table 4. With the A(1) and
Θ(1) zero-sum restrictions imposed, the estimate of θ is very small (one third195 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
that of Australia and about one tenth that of Argentina) but is significant at
less than the one per cent level. Due to Canada’s liberal commercial policy,
capital flows are accommodated with very modest adjustments to her real
exchange rate.9
B.3. Simultaneous Cross-Country Estimates
To test the significance of the differences in the estimates, the θ’s were
estimated simultaneously for all three countries by NSYS-ROB; the results
appear in Table 5. The estimates for Australia and Canada differ somewhat
from those reported in Table 4, but in view of the standard errors; the two sets
of estimates are not inconsistent. While the estimate of θ for Canada is positive,
it does not differ significantly from the estimate reported in Table 4. Tests on
cross-country equality restrictions on the θ parameter are summarized in
panel B, Table 5; all restrictions can be rejected at well below the one per
cent level, which lends further support to the central hypothesis of this study.
C. Further Tests on the Argentine Case
In April 1991 Argentina drastically reformed both her exchange rate and
monetary régimes. The peso was fixed against the U.S. dollar and became
convertible, thereby eliminating all capital controls.  Nonetheless, peso interest
rates converged only slowly to dollar rates, which resulted in a large capital
9 Referring back to the discussion in Section III.B, the point estimates of θ indicate that the
substitution effect may also influence the impact of import protection on the behavior of the
real exchange rate. Given the elasticities in equation (5), the magnitude of θ* varies inversely
with the “openness” ratio. That inverse for Argentina is 3.51 times that of Canada whereas
the estimate of θARG is 9.37 times θCAN, and the inverse for Australia is 1.53 times that of
Canada, while the estimate of θAUS is 3.18 times θCAN, which appears to leave considerable
room for the influence of the substitution effect. But as θi / θj = (apsH, i / apsH, j)
ij (/), θθ
 the
ratios θi / θj and 
/ ij θθ
may not be identical, so the differences between the ratios of the
inverses of the openness ratios and θi / θj  ratios may be due to the possibility that protection
increases the average propensity to spend on home goods. But as the Argentine propensity
can hardly be triple that of Canada, nor can the Australian propensity be double that of
Canada, import protection must reduce the scope forsubstitution between home and traded
goods.196 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 5. Simultaneous NSYS-ROB Real Exchange Rate Elasticity
Estimates (Equation 11): Argentina, Australia and Canada, 1978:1-92:4
A. Simultaneous Elasticity Estimates
Parameter Estimate t-statistic P-value
θARG -6.1183 -3.8694 0.0001
θAUS -1.7389 -2.5620 0.0104
θCAN 0.3634 0.6211 0.5346
B. Chi-Square Equality Tests on Elasticities
Restrictions χ2 Statistic P-value
θARG = θAUS 7.9587 0.0048
θARG = θCAN 11.6239 0.0007
θAUS = θCAN 7.1551 0.0075
All three 12.1893 0.0023
C. Summary  Statistics*
Country R2 SEE D-W                Ljung-Box test
Q(8) P-value
Argentina 0.9018 0.1056 1.8736 4.7711 0.7817
Australia 0.9582 0.0198 1.6281 4.8060 0.7781
Canada 0.9941 0.0119 1.4767 9.6346 0.2916
Note: * See  note in Table  4.
inflow, much of which is thought to be repatriation of foreign assets –– the
“Miami” dollars –– by Argentine residents. The inflation moderated sharply
but did not cease; from 1991:1 to 1993:1, consumer prices rose by 66 per
cent, while the wholesale price index, which is heavily weighted with traded197 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
goods, rose by only 18 per cent. The Argentine post-reform inflation, which
often has been attributed to inertia, clearly was concentrated in the home
goods and services sector. Due to these developments, the Argentine case
merits further analysis.
The degree to which the Argentine inflation following the régime change
was due to large capital inflows was examined by analyzing the residuals
(corrected to have a zero mean) of the OLS-GMM estimate of equation (11).
Those residuals were regressed on dummy variables defined for each quarter
of the 1990:1-92:4 period; the dummy variables were set to unity for the
quarter in question and zero for all others, and their coefficients (which are
the exact residuals for the quarters in question) and standard errors were
estimated by OLS with a separate run for each quarter. The results, which
appear in Table 6, indicate that the model performs even better after the régime
change than before; the average residual was 11.67 per cent in the five quarters
preceding the régime change versus 3.93 per cent for the seven quarters
Table 6. Real Exchange Rate Equation Residuals: Argentina,  1990:1-92:4*
Final kg (%) Residual Standard t-statistic P-value
quarter error
1990:1 -3.85 -0.1892 0.1082 -1.7491 0.0860
1990:2 -6.25 -0.2160 0.1072 -2.0144 0.0490
1990:3 -2.62 -0.0455 0.1110 -0.4099 0.6835
1990:4 0.33 -0.1058 0.1103 -0.9597 0.3415
1991:1 -2.81 -0.0268 0.1111 -0.2415 0.8101
1991:2 -0.96 0.0149 0.1112 0.1340 0.8939
1991:3 3.01 0.0655 0.1108 0.5912 0.5568
1991:4 4.71 0.1315 0.1097 1.1984 0.2360
1992:1 2.92 -0.0191 0.1112 -0.1722 0.8640
1992:2 5.18 0.0063 0.1112 0.0565 0.9551
1992:3 5.38 -0.0197 0.1112 -0.1771 0.8601
1992:4 5.06 0.0180 0.1112 0.1619 0.8720
Note: * Based on the estimate of equation 11 for Argentina, summarized in Table 4.198 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
beginning with 1991:2. Moreover, after the change in régime, only one residual
exceeded ten per cent and none were significantly different from zero. Indeed,
in 1992, despite a capital inflow of nearly five per cent of GDP, the residuals
were very small. Finally, while it might appear that negative forecast errors
are associated with capital outflows, that association is very weak, as only
one of the twelve residuals is significant at the five per cent level. These
results support the position that the Argentine post-reform inflation resulted
from capital inflows rather than sheer inertia.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the impact of import protection on the reaction of
the real exchange rate to international capital flows. The maintained hypothesis
is that import protection reduces the quantitative response of demand and
production to changes in the real exchange rate. The empirical results strongly
support that hypothesis. The evidence from three small countries, Argentina,
Australia, and Canada, indicates that during the period from the late 1970s to
the early 1990s the response of the real exchange rate to capital flows was
extremely large for Argentina (highly protectionist by any standard), quite
substantial for Australia (highly protectionist by OECD standards) but
negligible for Canada (a relatively free trading country). Indeed, the point
estimates reported in Table 4 indicate that a capital inflow of five per cent of
GDP would increase the Argentine price level relative to the price of traded
goods by 31 per cent, versus ten cent in Australia and only three per cent in
Canada. Moreover, the responses in all three countries differed significantly
at less than the one per cent level.
When neither the exchange rate nor the nominal wage is flexible, capital
flows can result in severe macroeconomic instability; the Argentine situation
of 1995-96 is a case in point. Owing to the Mexican crisis of late 1994, the
capital flow into Argentina reversed but, as the Argentine exchange rate was
fixed and the labor market exhibited little downward flexibility in nominal
wages, the real exchange rate mechanism could not come into play and the result
was a singular increase in unemployment.These results also provide an insight
into the issue of the sequencing of liberalization in developing countries that
was discussed in Section I. Eliminating capital controls prior to liberalizing199 IMPORT PROTECTION, CAPITAL FLOWS
trade will sooner or later lead to capital flows, and since protection magnifies
the response of the real exchange rate to capital flows, those flows will require
large adjustments in the relative price of home goods and wages. Although it
is hard to make a convincing case that capital movements are inherently bad,
the results of this study indicate that when a country imposes heavy restrictions
on current account transactions, it will do well to impose restrictions on capital
account transactions as well, a proposition that conforms to the general theory
of the second best. Although relaxing restrictions on international flows of both
capital and goods is widely viewed as desirable, this study suggests that capital
controls should not be dismantled until the commercial account has been
substantially opened.
Data Appendix
All data were quarterly for periods ranging from the 1970s to the early
1990s. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests (not reported but available
upon request) on the relevant variables for all three countries (with a trend for
variables when in level form) showed that, with four lags, unit roots were
rejected for all variables at the three per cent level and, when the variables
were first differenced, unit roots were rejected for all variables at the one per
cent level for all lags.
In all cases kg was defined as a fraction of GDP. As a GDP deflator was
unavailable for Argentina, the proxy for the real exchange rate was defined
on the consumer price index, pC, in all cases. The PT  variable was defined as
a weighted average of PM and PX using the ω parameter as defined earlier.
The exact form of the final term in equation (2), which was represented by
γ*ln(1 + TTt), is (ηH, YYt - εH, GGt) / (εH, H - ηH, H). By definition, yt = gt(1 + TTt),
where TTt is a first approximation of the terms-of-trade income effect as a
fraction of real GDP and defined as TTt ￿ 
1,1, ()/ tXttMtt xpmpg ∆∆
in which
a  *  superscript  indicates  that  the  variable  has  been  deflated  by  pc.  In  the
case of exports, 
∆ 1, ()/ tXtt xpg ,1, ()/ CtttXt pxgp  ∆  1, ()/ XtXtt xpPg ∆
and similarly for imports, so 
1,1, ()()/. tXtXtMtMtt TTxpPmpPg  ∆∆ 
Combining Yt = Gt + ln(1 + TTt) with the numerator of the exact form of the final
term in equation (2) yields ηH, YYt - εH, GGt = (ηH, Y - εH, G)Gt + ηH, Y ln(1 + TTt).200 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
As variations in y and g have similar effects on
D H q
 and
, S H q
respectively, the
elasticities ηH, Y and εH, G are both positive and similar in magnitude, the term
(ηH, Y -  εH, G)Gt was ignored and hence γ* = ηH, Y / (εH, H - ηH, H).
Argentina
Most Argentine data are from the FIEL database. The export and import
price variables are the wholesale price index for agricultural products, which
are Argentina’s main export, and the wholesale import price index, respectively.
The value of ω, 0.48, for constructing PT is from Sjaastad (1981). Because of
problems with the Argentine balance of payments data, net factor payments
abroad were excluded from the capital-flow measure in the Argentine case.
Those payments were excluded because, during the period in question,
Argentina had a large (gross) external debt, but her private-sector foreign assets
were smaller but of a similar order of magnitude. While service of the largely
official external debt does appear in the service account of the Argentine balance
of payments, it is widely believed that the earnings on privately-held foreign
assets do not because those earnings were largely unrepatriated, and no
imputation was made to the balance of payments for those earnings. Since the
factor service  account of the Argentine balance of payments grossly overstates
actual net service of external debt during the sample period, capital flows in
the Argentine case were defined as the deficit in merchandise and non-factor
service trade.
Australia and Canada
Australian and Canadian data are from TIME SERIES DATA EXPRESS
(EconData Pty Ltd of Australia). Import and export prices indices are identified
in the database as IMPIPI and EXPIPI, respectively. For both countries, the
capital flow variable was defined as the deficit in the goods and services
account of their balance of payments as a fraction of GDP. The values of ω,
0.60 for Australia and 0.76 for Canada, for constructing the traded-goods
price indices were obtained from a study reported in Sjaastad (1998b).
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